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Performance measurement systems and the publication of performance data are fundamental 
to the New Public Management, with its emphasis on decentralised service provision through 
a variety of agencies. There seem to be four reasons for this performance measurement: to see 
what works, to identify competences, to support public accountability and to allow control of 
decentralised service provision. Each of these is examined, using the root definitions that 
form part of soft systems methodology, which highlights the importance of different 
worldviews that provide justifications for different approaches to this measurement. If 
performance measurement systems are to be beneficial, their design should be based on 





Performance measurement, public sector, soft systems methodology 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last twenty years have seen major changes in the ways that some governments provide 
services to their publics. In some countries, notably the UK and New Zealand, there has been 
a shift from service provision via classic bureaucratic organisations to delivery via 
decentralised agencies and private sector providers. This latter mode of operation is often 
taken as a major part of the New Public Management (NPM). There are many definitions of 
NPM, but the following two are sufficiently rich to capture its essence: 
• Manning (2003), on the World Bank web-site, offers the following: “a management 
culture that emphasizes the centrality of the citizen or customer, as well as 
accountability for results.  It also suggests structural or organizational choices that 
promote decentralized control through a wide variety of alternative service delivery 
mechanisms, including quasi-markets with public and private service providers 
competing for resources from policymakers and donors.” 
• Gow and Dufour (2000), who discuss whether NPM can be properly considered as a 
paradigm, suggest that: “There are two main ideas when introducing NPM in public 
administration: (1) the separation of policy formulation from operations; and (2) the 
importance of management, inspired by private sector management.” (citing Charih and 
Rouillard, 1997: 27) 
This paper is not concerned with the degree to which NPM does or does not mimic the 
management of private sector organisations. Rather, its concern is the different uses made of 
performance measurement in public services when their actual provision is separated from 
policy and when a range of delivery mechanisms is in use – both being features of NPM. 
There are many different ways in which performance measurement can form part of 
NPM. Perhaps its most developed form is found in the UK government’s use of Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs), which are service level agreements between the Treasury and the 
service providers. The workings of the PSA system were the subject of discussions in the 
UK’s Parliamentary Select Committee on Public Administration (Stationery Office, 2003). 
From this, it seems that the main components of the PSA system are as follows. 
1. As a result of discussion about expenditure between service providers and the Treasury, 
national standards are set out in Public Service Agreements (PSAs). Once the spending 
round is complete, these PSAs are made public and are intended as goals to which 
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public managers should aspire and for which funding will be provided. For example, the 
2004 PSA of the Home Office includes the following (HM Treasury, 2004). 
• Reduce crime by 15%, and further in high crime areas, by 2007-08.  
• Reassure the public, reducing the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, and 
building confidence in the Criminal Justice System without compromising 
fairness. 
Note that one of these is stated in quantitative terms and the other is not. 
2. Once the PSAs are established, together with the funding to achieve them, the delivery 
units are allowed flexibility in how they organise and plan to achieve them. The 
resulting Delivery Plans, though published, are intended for use by service managers to 
specify what actions will be taken to achieve the targets. That is, Delivery Plans are 
intended for internal use as part of the process of planning to achieve targets and in 
assessing progress against those targets.  
3. Performance indicators, usually quantitative, are fundamental to this progress 
monitoring, as is the use of comparative benchmarking. Their use allows progress to be 
monitored against planned trajectories and against similar units. 
4. As an extension of benchmarking, there are attempts to transfer best practice, if this is 
appropriate, by seminars and other meetings at which managers present their work.  
5. There is external auditing of progress against the PSA targets, using inspection teams 
and published data. Performance data is regularly published and taken up by the media, 
who are wont, correctly or not, to construct league tables.  
6. Services, units and managers that meet their targets are rewarded for doing so and those 
that do not may suffer. Thus, for example, hospitals that perform well against their 
targets may be given increased autonomy in managing their finances and planning their 
services. Units that do not may be labelled as failing and managers may lose their jobs. 
Listed so tersely, such a performance regime can seem rather simple-minded. However, this 
would be a very unfair conclusion for it is important to realise that the six points are set within 
an iterative framework in which it is recognised that target setting and measurement are not 
straightforward. Thus, targets and measures may be initially rather crude, but there is an 
expectation that the performance of this performance management system will itself improve 
after several iterations. There are central units, some housed in the Treasury and a Prime 
Minister’s Delivery Unit, all tasked with ensuring that this performance regime is 
implemented effectively. 
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This brief description reveals a tightly organised performance management system 
that is rather different from traditional bureaucratic public service organisation. Other 
countries, notably New Zealand, have followed similar routes with similar aspirations, though 
obviously the detail is somewhat different. However, the above list may be taken as typical of 
the aspirations for performance measurement and management as employed in the delivery of 
public services. National targets are set, which then cascade down to local targets for service 
provision. Carrots and sticks are used to encourage the achievement of these targets, including 
increased autonomy for success, and naming and shaming for failure. It is well-known that, 
though powerful, such approaches have severe limitations and that alternative approaches 
may be preferable in some circumstances (Smith, 1995; Pidd, 2005). 
MEASURING PERFORMANCE 
Performance measurement is pervasive in organisations, whether public or private, and it is 
pointless to argue whether it is desirable or not. Some measurements are informal, as people 
keep their own records to see how particular activities are progressing. Other measurements 
are much more formal and may be required by law – for example, financial accounts must be 
produced, audited and published so as to reduce the possibility for fraud and to allow 
stakeholders to assess how well things are going. Such financial measurement is taken for 
granted in for-profit organisations and is also pervasive, in slightly different forms, in the 
public and not-for-profit sectors. 
The last 20 years have seen increasing interest in the measurement of other aspects of 
performance. The most widely used approach seems to be balanced scorecards, as proposed 
by Kaplan and Norton (1996). In their original form, these balanced scorecards were attempts 
to encourage businesses to focus on more than the immediate financial bottom line. They 
suggested that organisations attempt to measure their performance on four different 
dimensions: 
1. Learning and growth: how well does the business develop its people for the futures? A 
long term view 
2. Business processes: how well does the business operate? An internal view. 
3. Customers: how does the business appear to its customers? An external view. 
4. Financial: how well does the business perform in financial terms? A current view. 
Such a list seems sensible, but it raises the question of how managers should decide what to 
measure within these four dimensions? Financial measurement is well-established, at least in 
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terms of current performance, but what of the other dimensions? The usual advice is to focus 
on those aspects of performance in the other three dimensions that are leading indicators of 
future financial performance. This rests on a sensible assumption that, unless a business 
develops its assets, organises itself efficiently and looks after its customers, its future financial 
performance is likely to be poor. However, it also suggests that, even when balanced 
scorecards are used, the financial bottom line has the strongest pull in the private sector. 
Balanced scorecards seem to be ubiquitous in the UK public sector too, with 
considerable sums spent on external consultants to ensure their implementation. It is clear, 
however, that they should take a different form to those used in the for-profit sector in which 
bottom-line financial concerns predominate. In public service provision, the aim is not to 
maximise profit or returns on investment; that is, finance is a means to an end and not an 
objective. Hence, critics have suggested that public sector scorecards should be rather 
different. Moore (2003), for example, suggests a public value scorecard based on a public 
value chain in which public value replaces the financial bottom-line as the driver for the 
various measures included in the scorecard. Scorecards can be regarded as a welcome 
recognition that any measurement of performance, certainly in the provision of public 
services, is multi-dimensional. Rather than hiding this multi-dimensionality away in a 
summary measure, the various criteria and measures are displayed alongside one another, 
leaving for debate the question of which criteria are most important. 
WHY MEASURE THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC SERVICES? 
The Royal Statistical Society (RSS) is much exercised about performance measurement in 
public services, this having been a major concern since its foundation. For example, in one of 
the RSS journals, Goldstein and Spiegelhalter (1996) strongly criticises the way in which 
published performance indicators are often unthinkingly used in constructing league tables. 
The basis of the critique is that performance indicators are, in essence, based on simple 
statistical models and that any resulting performance estimates should carry reasonable 
estimates of error. Once these are included in the measures, then much of the apparent ranking 
in league tables disappears, since there is no statistically significant difference in performance 
between the many of the units ranked in the tables. As in most sports, mid-table teams are all 
pretty much of a muchness. This and other examples caused the RSS to call for more 
appropriate performance measurement in public services, preferably on some scientific basis. 
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Hence it commissioned a report (Bird et al, 2003) in which the various problems are discussed 
and proposals are made for improvement. 
Reasonably enough, Bird et al (op cit) addresses the question: why measure 
performance? It proposes three reasons: 
1. To see what works: this is the use of quantitative indicators as a foundation for 
evidence-based policy by measuring and comparing the performance of different 
delivery and policy options. To be properly done, this requires the careful use of 
statistical methods and designed comparisons: some of the possible approaches are 
described in Boyne et al (2002). Thus, if there are several options available, the 
performance of each can be measured and this information can be used for comparison 
to determine the best way to proceed. Alternatively, the impact of a single policy might 
be measured by comparing its costs and benefits to see if it is worthwhile. 
2. To identify competences: this is the use of quantitative indicators to identify good 
performers (and, by implication, poor performers). Often the resulting performance data 
are published; for example in school league tables, the star ratings of NHS hospital 
trusts and, more recently, the performance of social service departments in UK local 
authorities. An ultimate aim of such measurement is to encourage the transfer of 
knowledge and expertise and to inform services managers about how well they are 
performing. The idea is that the identification of high performers will enable poorer 
performers to learn how to improve – it also provides positive feedback to the high 
performers. 
3. To support public accountability: this rests mainly on the publication of performance 
data to allow members of the public to see whether services are being delivered 
properly and offer value for money. Since NPM separates policy from operations, it is 
clear that the accountability loop must be closed in some way; otherwise there will be 
no link between policy and action. Though this measurement may, in theory, be for 
public use, politicians are intimately concerned with this aspect of measurement since 
part of their future may depend on it. Whether the general public is so interested is a 
moot point. The indications from local authorities (Miller, 2003) and health care 
(Marshall et al, 2000) suggest that public interest is rather limited. 
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It should, though, be clear that this three-part list is incomplete: that is, something is 
missing. From the earlier description of the UK’s PSA system it is clear that retaining central 
control with decentralised delivery is a major concern and forms a major part of its rationale. 
Hence, there is clearly a fourth reason for measuring the performance of public services: to 
enable central control. That is, performance indicators are used to see what works, to identify 
competences, to support public accountability and to allow control of decentralised service 
provision. Having four different aims, allows plenty of space for confusion and the rest of this 
paper uses ideas from Soft Systems Methodology to try to bring some conceptual clarity into 
the continuing discussion about performance measurement in the provision of public services. 
SOFT SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY AND ROOT DEFINITIONS 
Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) was developed by Checkland and colleagues at Lancaster 
through an action research programme that ran for over 20 years. For brief accounts of SSM 
see Checkland (2001) or Pidd (2003, chapter 5) and for the complete account, see Checkland 
(1981). For an account of a public sector study that was based on SSM, see Brown et al 
(2005) or Brown and Cooper (2004). 
Defining what we mean by system 
The word ‘system’ is in everyday use and some have argued for many years that we live in a 
‘systems age’ (Ackoff, 1974). People commonly refer to human nervous systems, to taxation 
systems, to transport systems and, in the context of this paper, to performance measurement 
systems. However, this everyday use of the term ‘system’ can be very misleading and it is 
important develop a careful definition so as to avoid unnecessary confusion. This is 
particularly important when applying SSM, in which a system is a concept used to account for 
behaviour observed or expected in the external world. That is, systemicity lies in the eyes of 
the beholder. 
With this in mind, Checkland (1981, p 317) defines a system as: ‘a model of a whole 
entity; when applied to human activity, the model is characterised fundamentally in terms of 
hierarchical structure, emergent properties, communication and control. An observer may 
choose to relate this model to real-world activity. When applied to natural or man-made 
entities, the crucial characteristic is the emergent properties of the whole’. SSM is particularly 
concerned with human activity systems – purposive (i.e. serving a purpose) systems that 
express some purposeful (i.e. deliberate or willed) human activity. That is, a human activity 
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system is a conceptual model of some purpose-designed entity in which humans engage in 
deliberate activity. 
SSM as a methodology 
In SSM, a human activity system is an intellectual construct that can provide a useful way of 
discussing organised human action. There is, though, no need to assume that such purposive 
systems actually exist, just to accept that they are convenient. As a methodology, SSM is a 
learning cycle that aims to support people engaged in the messy task of real-world thinking 
and problem solving. This paper is not the place to provide an extended account of SSM as a 
methodology for which readers should consult the references cited earlier. Checkland’s own 
description of SSM has varied over the years and the current favourite is shown in figure 1, 
based on that in Checkland and Holwell (2004, p 52). 
 
Figure 1: An outline of soft systems methodology 
The SSM learning cycle begins with a real-world problem situation, which some 
people have come to regard as problematic enough to warrant serious attention, usually with a 
view to seeking improvement. This problem situation needs to be explored, so as to 
understand the links between its various facets that have led to whatever is regarded as 
unsatisfactory. Checkland and Scholes (1990) suggests the use of a range of analyses for this 
investigation so as to lead to the definition of some relevant purposeful activity models. These 
models are often developed using ‘root definitions’ – a concept that will be used later in this 
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paper to explore different views of performance measurement. These models of how things 
could be are then compared with the current situation to support a debate about desirable 
change. To make progress it may be necessary to repeat the SSM cycle a few times. 
Root definitions 
The aim of an SSM study is usually to bring about some improvement, however this is 
defined, and making an improvement usually requires some change to be made. Rather than 
proceed direct to a redesign of the unsatisfactory human activity system, it is normal to 
present idealised models, or hypotheses, of how these might be composed. These idealisations 
are captured in root definitions. Mingers and Taylor (1992) reports on a survey of SSM use 
that shows root definitions to be among the most commonly employed techniques of SSM. 
Root definitions are normally summarised in the CATWOE mnemonic: Customers, 
Actors, Weltanschauung, Ownership and Environmental Constraints. They are discussed in 
detail as part of conceptual modelling in Wilson (2001). The following brief account of 
CATWOEs is taken from Pidd (2003, p125ff). 
• Customers. These are the immediate beneficiaries or victims of what the system does. It 
can be an individual, several people, a group or groups. This is very close to the total 
quality management (TQM) notion that the customer is the next person to receive the 
work in progress. It indicates what happens to the output from the system and forms 
part of the external relations of the system. 
• Actors. In any human activity system there are people who carry out one or more of the 
activities in the system, these are the actors. They form part of the internal relations of 
the system. There may be several actors or several groups and their relationships also 
form part of the internal relations of the system. 
• Transformation process. This is the core of the human activity system in which some 
definite input is converted into some output and then passed on to the customers. The 
actors take part in this transformation process. The process is an activity and its 
description therefore requires the use of verbs. Ideally, a root definition should focus on 
a single transformation. 
• Weltanschauung. This is the, often taken for granted, outlook or world view which 
makes sense of the root definition being developed. It is important to specify this 
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because any system definitions can only make sense with some defined context. Thus a 
root definition needs only a single Weltanschauung. 
• Ownership. This is the individual or group responsible for the proposed system in the 
sense that they have the power to modify it or even to close it down. This can overlap 
with the actors of the system. 
• Environmental constraints. All human activity systems operate within some constraints 
imposed by their external environment. These might be, for example, legal, physical or 
ethical. They form part of the external relations of the system and need to be 
distinguished from its ownership. 
The six elements of a root definition need to be consistent with one another; otherwise 
the root definition will not make sense. It is particularly important to consider the 
Weltanschauung, since a root definition will only make sense within this worldview or 
ideology. Many human activity systems can be conceptualised from a range of worldviews, 
which is one reason why different people may quite reasonably propose radically different 
options for change when considering a problem situation. CATWOEs provide a neutral 
language that permits different worldviews to be teased out during the process of formulating 
options for change. This can be helpful in highly charged situations in which opinions differ 
markedly. 
Though most ‘classical’ SSM studies are aimed at improvement, here the idea is to 
support some thinking about why performance measurement is a part of public service 
provision under NPM.  That is, this paper does not describe an improvement study, rather it 
uses root definitions as a means to analyse the four different reasons cited earlier for 
measuring the performance of public services.  
CONSTRUCTING ROOT DEFINITIONS FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
An earlier section suggested that there are four main reasons for employing performance 
measurement in the delivery of public services: to see what works, to identify competences, to 
support public accountability and to allow control of decentralised service provision. Root 
definitions will be constructed for each of these, to see what light such an analysis can shed.  
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To see what works 
In any root definition it is important to establish the Weltanschauung, or worldview, within 
which the description make sense. Of course a description could make sense within several 
worldviews, but their consideration is still a good starting point. In this case, it is perhaps best 
to assume that performance measurement is part of a drive for evidence-based policy. That is, 
for ensuring the policy for public service delivery is based on the type of evidence that comes 
from a performance evaluation. From this, it possible to construct a possible root definition 
under the six CATWOE headings. 
Customers: since the performance evaluation is conducted to inform the policy makers then it 
seems reasonable to regard them as the main customers. Though it is of course true that the 
public should benefit from improved policy, the customers in a root definition are the 
immediate beneficiaries or victims: in this case, the policy makers. 
Actors: were the proposals of the RSS, summarised in Bird et al (op cit) to be implemented, 
then an independent cadre of performance analysts would occupy this role. However, real life 
is somewhat different and so the best than can be said is that performance measurement to see 
what works will be run by a group appointed to do so. 
Transformation: the aim of such a performance measurement system is to produce proper 
evidence of whether or not a policy works or is better or worse than some alternative. This 
must, of course, be done in the light of the purpose of the public service under scrutiny. 
Weltanschauung: given the opening sentences of this section, a worldview within which the 
rest of the root definition makes sense is one which states that policy based on soundly 
collected and analysed evidence is likely to be better than that based solely on dogma or 
expediency. 
Ownership: there seem to be two communities that can modify or close down such 
performance measurement systems and these are the political and policy communities as 
reflected in the government of the day. 
Environmental constraints: the obvious ones to consider relate to the legal system, available 
finances and available skills, which will all directly affect such performance measurement in 
practice. 
Hence, summarising this root definition in a couple of sentences leads to something 
like the following: A system that provides evidence for policy makers about the performance 
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of public services, based on an assumption that such evidence leads to better policy. It is 
operated by a group appointed to do so, is owned by the government and operates within 
legal constraints using available finance and human resources. 
It is, of course, possible to conceive of a different form of performance measurement 
to see what works; one that is run by the service providers themselves in order to learn what 
works, enabling them to improve their performance. This becomes performance measurement 
to support learning and might have a root definition as follows. 
Customers: in this case the immediate beneficiaries are the people who provide and manage 
the services in question, rather than the policy makers. 
Actors: these are likely to be the staff of the service provider, aided by specialist analysts if 
that is appropriate. 
Transformation: such a performance measurement system is intended to provide evidence of 
service quality to those who run the service. 
Weltanschauung: this type of performance measurement rests on an assumption that 
collecting, analysing and feeding back information about performance, by those who provide 
that service, will enable learning that should lead to improved performance. 
Ownership: without the active co-operation of the service providers such a system will not 
succeed, however it may still be within the remit of the government to close it down. 
Environmental constraints: this too operates within legal constraints, plus those defined by 
the finance and expertise available, controlled by the government. 
As before, this can be captured in a couple of sentences, defining such performance 
measurement as: A system that provides feedback to service providers, operated by or on 
behalf of those providers, about the quality of service provision. It assumes that such feedback 
will support learning and continuous improvement and must operate with legal constraints 
using available financial and human resources and with the co-operation of the service 
providers and of the government. 
To identify competences 
This form of performance measurement, unlike that conducted to see what works, has only a 
single general form to be captured in a root definitions. This measurement to identify 
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competences is intended for the benefit of the funding bodies – central government in this 
case. Its CATWOE might look as follows. 
Customers: since the performance evaluation is conducted to inform the funders, central 
government, then it seems reasonable to regard them as the main customers. As with the 
previous root definitions, It is of course true that the public should benefit from improved 
services, however the immediate beneficiaries are the central government. 
Actors: were the proposals of the RSS, summarised in Bird et al (op cit) to be implemented, 
then an independent cadre of performance analysts would occupy this role (as with 
measurement to see what works). However, real life is somewhat different and so the best 
than can be said is that performance measurement to see what works will be run by a group 
appointed to do so. 
Transformation: the aim of such a performance measurement system is to produce 
comparative performance indicators so that best practice can be identified. This must, of 
course, be done in the light of the purpose of the public service under scrutiny. 
Weltanschauung: a worldview within which the rest of the root definition makes sense is one 
which states learning can occur across provider units if best practice and, poor performance 
can be identified. 
Ownership: there seem to be two communities that can modify or close down such 
performance measurement systems and these are the political and policy communities as 
reflected in the government of the day. 
Environmental constraints: the obvious ones to consider relate to the legal system, available 
finances and available skills, which will all directly affect such performance measurement in 
practice. 
Hence, summarising this root definition in a couple of sentences leads to something 
like the following: A system that provides evidence for policy makers about the relative 
performance of different providers of public services, based on an assumption that this will 
allow identification of best practice and of poor performance. It is operated by a group 
appointed to do so, is owned by the government and operates within legal constraints using 
available finance and human resources. 
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To support public accountability 
The previous two reasons for performance measurement in the delivery of public services 
have been relatively internal – internal, that is, to government, policy makers and service 
delivery organisations. However, performance measurement to support public accountability 
must, if it is to be done properly, have an external focus. Hence a suitable root definition 
might be as follows. 
Customers: since the performance evaluation is conducted to inform the public, it seems 
reasonable to regard them as the main customers. It is of course true that the image of the 
government should improve if public services are seen to improve but this is a subsidiary 
concern in this case. 
Actors: as with the previous root definitions, were the proposals of the RSS, summarised in 
Bird et al (op cit) to be implemented, then an independent cadre of performance analysts 
would occupy this role. However, real life is somewhat different and so the best than can be 
said is that performance measurement to see what works will be run by a group appointed to 
do so. 
Transformation: the aim of such a performance measurement system is to produce 
information for public consumption that is an accurate and understandable indicator of the 
performance of public services. This must, of course, be done in the light of the purpose of the 
public service under scrutiny and with public priorities in mind.   
Weltanschauung: given the customers, actors and transformation, it is clear that the 
worldview underpinning this root definition is that the public have a right to know how well 
public services are performing. Whether they are interested in this information is another 
question altogether. 
Ownership: to the usual two communities that can modify or close down such performance 
measurement systems - the political and policy communities as reflected in the government of 
the day – we must also add the public itself. 
Environmental constraints: the obvious ones to consider relate to the legal system, available 
finances and available skills, which will all directly affect such performance measurement in 
practice. We should also note that the relative interest of the public could be a constraint. 
Summarising this root definition in a couple of sentences leads to something like the 
following: A system that provides evidence for the public about the performance of public 
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services, based on an assumption that the public has a right to know. It is operated by a group 
appointed to do so, is owned by the government and operates within legal constraints using 
available finance and human resources and should take account of the public’s interest. One 
problem with this type of root definition is that it assumes the existence of the ‘public’ and 
this turns out to be a far from straightforward assumption. This is amply demonstrated by 
Contandriopoulos, Denis and Langley (2004) in its demonstration of the problematic nature of 
the ‘public’ in Canadian health care. 
To enable central control 
Though there are clear linkages between the four different perspectives on performance 
measurement, though are also major differences, as should be clear from the root definition 
developed in this section. As before, the 6 elements of CATWOE will be used to develop the 
root definitions. 
Customers: since the performance evaluation is conducted to ensure that public services are 
provided according to central plans and requirements, it is clear that the direct beneficiaries of 
the evaluation are the government and policy staff at the centre. They would, of course, argue, 
that this control is exercised in the public interest, but in root definition terms, the government 
and policy staff are the clear customers.  
Actors: there seem to be three main sets of actors if this central control is to be successfully 
achieved. The first are staff in the units that provide the service (a hospital, benefit office, or 
whatever) whose job is to collect data that is submitted to the centre. The second group is the 
people in the centre who receive this data, analyse it and draw conclusions about the 
performance of the units. The third group is the government and policy staff who take action, 
if needed, to encourage good performance, using whatever incentives are considered 
appropriate.  
Transformation: the aim of such a performance measurement system is to allow a central 
group to exert control over service providers. Thus the transformation, were such a system not 
in place, is to go from no control to whatever control is required. 
Weltanschauung: if it were thought that local service providers would automatically follow 
central guidelines and requirements, then such central control would be unnecessary. Thus, 
such central control seems to be based on a view that without it, service providers would not 
operate as required. 
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Ownership: there seem to be two communities that can modify or close down such 
performance measurement systems and these are the political and policy communities as 
reflected in the government of the day. 
Environmental constraints: the obvious ones to consider relate to the legal system, available 
finances and available skills, which will all directly affect such performance measurement in 
practice. 
Expressing this CATWOE in a couple of sentences might lead to something like the 
following: A system that enables government and its policy staff to exercise control over 
service providers whose performance is monitored on behalf of a central evaluation unit and 
this is justified because, without it, service quality would not improve and might deteriorate. 
It must operate with legal constraints using available financial and human resources and with 
the co-operation of the government. 
COMPARING THE ROOT DEFINITIONS 
Root definitions, as developed in SSM by Checkland and colleagues, were intended to enable 
the comparison of the current situation by supporting a debate about alternative designs. That 
this debate should include consideration of different worldviews is crucial. It is important, 
though, to realise that any models developed from the root definitions are not models of the 
real world but, instead, are conceptualisations of aspects that would be expected in any 
attempts at implementation. In this paper, the root definitions are not being used for 
comparison with an as-is situation, but to support a debate about possible and desirable uses 
for performance measurement. Hence, the comparison is between the root definitions 
themselves. The previous section developed five root definitions, which are summarised in 
Table 1. 
Similarities 
It is easiest to start with the obvious similarities between the root definitions. It is clear from 
Table 1 that these are to be found in the O (ownership) and E (environmental constraints) of 
the CATWOES. Since the different systems are funded through central taxation, it should be 
no surprise that government itself and its advisors are regarded as the owners, as they have the 
power to shut things down. It might be argued that the real situation is more subtle than this, 
since it would not actually be possibly to operate such systems without some degree of 
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acceptance by service providers and the general public. However, the direct power seems to 
rest with government and its advisors. This seems uncontroversial and pretty obvious. 
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Table 1: The root definitions summarised 
Three of the root definitions assume that a group of measurement specialists will be 
the main actors in the measurement system. These are the root definitions for measurement 
as: the external attempt to see what works, the attempt to establish competences and the view 
that measurement is needed to support public accountability. They have in common a notion 
that measurement is externally imposed and that those providing the public service either 
should not be burdened with the measurement task or cannot be relied upon to do it properly. 
As commented earlier, the RSS Working Party (Bird et al, op cit) seem to assume that such a 
role could be occupied by its own members or by some apolitical body accredited for this 
purpose. 
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Differences 
As we consider the differences, things start to get interesting. First, consider the different 
views of who will benefit from the measurement: in SSM terms, who are the customers of the 
system? If measurement is externally imposed to see what works, then it is clear that it is 
intended for the immediate benefit of those who develop and are responsible for public 
policy. Of course the measurement may be of interest to the public and of some value to the 
service providers, but the clear intention is that it should be used in policy development. It is 
hard to argue that this use of measurement is a bad thing, but there can be negative 
consequences, as will be discussed later. By contrast, if the measurement is internally driven 
by the service providers themselves so that they can see what works, then this is clearly for 
their benefit since it can support their learning and improvement. In the case of internally 
driven measurement, the performance indicators are probably not intended for external 
consumption, possibly from a fear of misinterpretation, but also from a concern that they 
might lead to external praise or blame, which will not support innovation and may reduce the 
learning and improvement. 
Who are the customers if the aim of the measurement is to establish competencies? It 
seems that they are the people who hold the purse strings: central government in the case of 
national public services. As with the external attempt to see what works, there are obviously 
other groups interested, but the main beneficiaries are those who foot the bills, since it enables 
them to identify the good and poor service providers. It could be argued that the next root 
definition, measurement for public accountability, is similar: the public rather than the 
political classes can see where standards are high. If we believe that people have a right to 
choose between different providers of public services, then this form of measurement and its 
publication are vital. Finally, what of measurement to enable central control? This is an 
extreme form of measurement to establish competences, with the added rider that the 
customers (government and policy staff in this case) will act to reward good performance and 
to punish poor performance: praise and blame. If any learning occurs in the provider units, it 
is based on a stimulus:response model which may lead top highly defensive behaviour – 
hardly the best way to encourage innovation and creativity. 
It is, of course, in the essential transformation and Weltanschauugen that the major 
differences in the five root definitions are most obvious. In the two cases of measurement to 
see what works, the essential transformation (what the system does) is the provision of 
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evidence. In one case this is for policy development in the belief that evidence-based policy is 
better than that plucked from the thin air of political whim. In the other case, this is to help the 
service providers understand the good and bad points of their operations in the belief, as 
mentioned above, that this will support their learning. If the services provided have some 
degree of repetition and if outcomes can be related to actions taken, this form of measurement 
goes some way to meet the criteria set by Hofstede (1981) for improvement by routine 
control. Moving to the right of Table 1, the next column represents measurement by agents of 
the government to establish competences, with its implicit notion of comparison. As with 
internal measurement to see what works, the justification for this measurement is that it will 
support learning. However, it should be noted that it is the central government or its agents 
that learns, rather than the service providers. If the two approaches to measurement could be 
aligned without coercion, then it may be possible to have the best of both worlds. 
The next column of Table 1 represents measurement to support public accountability 
and hence its essential transformation is to provide information for the public, based on the 
straightforward premise that the public has a right to know. As mentioned earlier, it turns out 
to be harder to define what we mean by the public that might be the case. For example, 
Contandriopoulos, Denis and Langley (op cit) discuss this in the context of Canadian 
healthcare and identify three different ‘publics’ whose support is often solicited by politicians. 
The first group they call the reified public and it includes the ‘real public’, the ‘average man 
or woman’ and the ‘ordinary citizen’. This is an abstract group with no involvement in the 
healthcare system and has “the same status as the abstract citizen upon whom the democratic 
system rests.” (p1580, op cit). This reified public occupies a privileged place since its 
members are thought of as ‘average men and women’ who are, almost by definition, relatively 
ignorant and in need of education and information. Anyone who gets involved in the system 
will lose their status as ‘average man or woman’. They call the second group the public’s 
voices and it includes those who participate in decision-making processes such as citizens’ 
representatives, community organisations, citizens’ groups etc.. These people project 
themselves as effective public representatives, but others in the system often do not see them 
in these terms, rather seeing them as partial and with conflicts of interest. They are engaged in 
a symbolic struggle for the right to speak for the ‘public’ and may attempt to present 
themselves as ‘average men or women’. Finally, there are the users, patients, families and 
others who consume services and who have opinions and interests that differ significantly 
from those of the ‘general public’.  Which group is the public who will act as customers for 
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this fourth root definition? Which is the public that has a right to know and what do they have 
a right to know? How can performance data be provided that is meaningful and is it to be 
aimed at the uninformed reified public, the public’s voices or at service users? 
Finally, table 1 shows measurement to enable central control, which pretty much 
defines the transformation of the root definition – to enable those who hold the purse strings 
to remain in control. This is based on a belief that any improvement in service quality will 
only be achieved if central control is maintained. Thus information is collected at the behest 
of the centre and is used there to engineer whatever changes it feels are necessary. 
A call for clarity 
The preceding discussion covers five different justifications for the use of performance 
measurement in the delivery of public services. It is obviously possible to design performance 
measurement systems that fit more than a single column of Table 1, but this will not happen 
by accident. It will only happen if there is an explicit debate about the intended purpose of the 
measurement system. It is possible to make a sensible case for each of the five root definitions 
and this is evident in the fact that their underpinning Weltanschauungen do make sense as 
worldviews that are appropriate justifications. However, it is pointless to pretend that 
organisational learning and innovation is encouraged by externally imposed regimes that 
feature praise and blame. Thus the argument presented here can be summarised as follows: 
1. There are four obvious reasons for the use of performance measurement in the 
delivery of public services: to see what works, to identify competences, to support 
public accountability and to allow control of decentralised service provision. 
2. Any attempts to design and implement such performance measurement systems 
should include explicit consideration of their underpinning worldviews and the 
transformations that follows from this. A system can meet multiple objectives, but is 
much more likely to do so if designed for this purpose. 
3. It is highly unlikely that an externally imposed measurement system that aims to 
enable central control will also be useful in supporting innovation, experimentation 
and learning. 
4. If the performance indicators are intended for public consumption, it is important to 
be clear who this public is and it may be necessary to use expert intermediaries to 
explain the significance of the observed performance. 
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